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Abstract
This paper describes a system developed for detecting propaganda techniques from news articles.
We focus on examining how emotional salience features extracted from a news segment can
help to characterize and predict the presence of propaganda techniques. Correlation analyses
surfaced interesting patterns that, for instance, the “loaded language” and “slogan” techniques are
negatively associated with valence and joy intensity but are positively associated with anger, fear
and sadness intensity. In contrast, “flag waving” and “appeal to fear-prejudice” have the exact
opposite pattern. Through predictive experiments, results further indicate that whereas BERT-only
features obtained F1-score of 0.548, emotion intensity features and BERT hybrid features were
able to obtain F1-score of 0.570, when a simple feedforward network was used as the classifier in
both settings. On gold test data, our system obtained micro-averaged F1-score of 0.558 on overall
detection efficacy over fourteen propaganda techniques. It performed relatively well in detecting
“loaded language” (F1 = 0.772), “name calling and labeling” (F1 = 0.673), “doubt” (F1 = 0.604)
and “flag waving” (F1 = 0.543).
1 Introduction
Propaganda is studied in a wide range of social sciences disciplines, including social psychology, political
science, media and mass communication, as well as advertising and marketing (Davison, 1971; Taylor,
2002; Balfour, 1979; McGarry, 1958). As Jowett and O’Donnell (2018) put it, propaganda is a “deliberate,
systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behavior to achieve a response
that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist”. To achieve the agenda, propagandists may use various
influence techniques such as loaded emotive language and flag waving. Such techniques are centered on
influencing the audiences’ opinions and behaviors through psychological and rhetorical tricks in order to
reach its purpose, such as promoting a particular politician or product in political or marketing campaigns.
The ability to automatically detect propaganda has important societal implications. For news manage-
ment, propaganda detection may help publishers to quickly identify news articles that may be subjected to
propagandistic characteristics that severely deviate from journalism principles. For the general public,
such tools may raise awareness for social media users to stay alert of potential propagandistic content,
which often may leverage non-obvious psychological tricks, and potentially mitigate the propagation of
such content.
We participated in Task 11 on the detection of propaganda techniques in news articles (Da San Martino
et al., 2020a), in particular the Technique Classification task (task TC), a multi-class classification task
that aims to classify each identified text segment with the existence of a collection of fourteen propaganda
techniques (Da San Martino et al., 2020a). Appendix A provides a summary and a distribution analysis on
this task. This text segment-based ground truth data presents an advancement to this line of study with
an ability to allow an algorithm to not only identify the existence of propaganda, but also to name the
specific techniques.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. License details: http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.
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Our approach focuses on exploring the value of sentence-level emotional salience features to charac-
terize propaganda techniques. From the definitions of the fourteen techniques used in Da San Martino
et al. (2019)’s original paper, at least six techniques conceptually involve emotion-associated proper-
ties, including strong emotional connotations or emotional appeal. Consider the following examples in
Da San Martino et al. (2019):
1. “stop those refugees; they are terrorists” [“appeal to fear-prejudice”]
2. “the best of the best” [“exaggeration,minimisation”]
3. “Entering this war will make us have a better future in our country” [“flag waving”]
4. “a lone lawmaker’s childish shouting” [“loaded language”]
5. “Republican congressweasels” [“name calling,labeling”]
6. “Make America great again!” [“slogans”]
To extract the sentence-level emotional salience features in the news segments, we leveraged Gupta and
Yang (2018)’s work which trains a collection of SVM-based algorithms, named as CrystalFeel1, which
detects the intensities of five emotion dimensions present in a given text message, including the sentiment
valence, joy, anger, fear and sadness (Gupta and Yang, 2018). As the key purpose of propaganda is to
influence or persuade the audiences, our main design hypothesis is that sentence-level emotional salience
features will help to characterize a few most commonly used propaganda techniques that involve a degree
of emotional connotations in their language manifestations. Table 1 illustrates the emotion intensity scores
derived on six propaganda examples used in (Da San Martino et al., 2019).
Text segment example Detected Emotion Intensity Scores (Gupta and Yang, 2018)
Valence
Intensity
Joy
Intensity
Anger
Intensity
Fear
Intensity
Sadness
Intensity
“stop those refugees; they are
terrorists” [“appeal to fear-
prejudice”]
0.305 0.123 0.622 0.551 0.483
“the best of the best” [“exagger-
ation,minimisation”]
0.653 0.520 0.208 0.183 0.267
“Entering this war will make us
have a better future in our coun-
try” [“flag waving”]
0.563 0.344 0.332 0.406 0.374
“a lone lawmaker’s childish
shouting” [“loaded language”]
0.323 0.126 0.516 0.487 0.520
“Republican congressweasels”
[“name calling,labeling”]
0.456 0.216 0.367 0.371 0.418
“Make America great again!”
[“slogans”]
0.672 0.592 0.264 0.201 0.286
Table 1: Emotional salience extracted from six examples of emotion elicitation-related propaganda
techniques.
2 Related Work
Propaganda analysis, system and detection. Computational approach to propaganda detection is
relatively a new topic (see Da San Martino et al. (2020b) for a review). Da San Martino et al. (2019)
formulate the problem of the detection of specific propaganda techniques which is directly related to this
paper. Barro´n-Cedeno et al. (2019) and Da San Martino et al. (2020c) showed how their Proppy and Prta
systems can support users to unmask and analyze propaganda in the news with interactive interfaces.
The closest to our work is the analytic study by Rashkin et al. (2017). Rashkin et al. (2017) compared the
linguistic patterns, e.g., psycholinguistic features from LIWC, sentiments, hedging words and intensifying
1CrystalFeel is available at: http://www.crystalfeel.socialanalyticsplus.net/
words, across four categories of news: propaganda, trusted news, hoax, or satire. They found interesting
linguistic differences in the three fake news categories vis--vis trusted news, though the predictive
experiments showed that LIWC do not improve over the neural model in terms of predictive model
performance, probably due to that some of this lexical information is perhaps redundant to what the model
was already learning from the text (Rashkin et al., 2017). What Rashkin et al. (2017) focused on are
word-level or lexical linguistic features. None of the existing work has explored the value of sentence-level
sentiment and emotion intensity features in the context of propaganda detection.
Emotion intensity detection and analysis. Classic sentiment analysis typically provides classification
results for discrete sentiment (e.g., positive, negative, neutral) and emotion classification analysis (e.g.,
happy vs. no happy, sad vs. no sad). Emotion intensity analysis is relatively a new development in the
context of predicting the degree or intensity of the underlying emotional valence and dimensions in text
messages such as tweets (Mohammad and Bravo-Marquez, 2017; Mohammad et al., 2018). Gupta and
Yang (2018) trained CrystalFeel with features derived from parts-of-speech, n-grams, word embedding,
multiple existing affective lexicons, and an in-house developed emotion intensity lexicon to predict the
degree of the intensity associated with fear, anger, sadness, and joy in the tweets. Its predicted sentiment
intensity had arrived a Pearson correlation coefficient (r) value of .816 on sentiment intensity with
out-of-training sample of human annotations, and of .708, .740, .700 and .720 on emotion intensities in
predicting joy, anger, fear and sadness (Gupta and Yang, 2018).
3 Correlation Analysis
To gain an exploratory understanding on the usefulness of the emotional salience features, we performed
bivariate correlation analyses between each of the propaganda ground truth labels for the 1,043 text
segments in the development set and the emotion intensity scores derived from CrystalFeel. Table 2
reports the correlation results. Non-parametric measure of Kendall’s τ was used for the correlation test
because the ground truth is a dichotomous variable (1 indicates the propaganda technique is present in the
text; 0 indicates otherwise).
Propaganda technique Kendall’s τ coefficient
Valence
Intensity
Joy
Intensity
Anger
Intensity
Fear
Intensity
Sadness
Intensity
“appeal to authority” 0.041 0.011 -0.002 -0.010 -0.066**
“appeal to fear-prejudice” -0.064* -0.074** 0.073** 0.160** 0.057*
“bandwagon,reductio ad hitlerum” 0.042 0.028 0.001 0.030 -0.060*
“black-and-white fallacy” 0.019 -0.019 -0.039 -0.038 -0.041
“causal oversimplification” -0.004 -0.035 0.046 0.022 -0.012
“doubt” -0.079** -0.118** 0.071** 0.045 -0.023
“exaggeration,minimisation” 0.051* 0.086** -0.012 -0.014 0.010
“flag waving” 0.182** 0.099** -0.179** -0.168** -0.167**
“loaded language” -0.224** -0.089** 0.181** 0.140** 0.243**
“name calling,labeling” 0.066** 0.032 -0.039 0.010 -0.062*
“repetition” 0.032 0.029 -0.066** -0.081** 0.006
“slogans” 0.089** 0.063* -0.110** -0.136** -0.088**
“thought-terminating cliches” 0.063* 0.065* -0.062* -0.050* -0.040
“whataboutism,straw men,red h.” 0.015 -0.009 0.011 -0.005 -0.068**
Table 2: Correlation between the ground truth labels and emotion intensities in the development set
(** indicates p value < 0.01; * indicates p value < 0.05)
Results indicate interesting patterns: “loaded language, “flag waving”, “slogans”, “appeal to fear-
prejudice”, and a total of twelve propaganda techniques are significantly correlated with at least one of the
emotion intensity scores (∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05, n = 1, 043).
Most notably, “loaded language” is negatively correlated with valence intensity (τ = −0.224**) and joy
intensity (τ = −0.089**), but is positively correlated with anger intensity (τ = 0.181**), fear intensity
(τ = 0.140**) and sadness intensity (τ = 0.243**). The “slogans” technique has a similar correlational
pattern.
In contrast, “flag waving” has the exact opposite pattern, where it is positively correlated with valence
intensity (τ = 0.182**) and joy intensity (τ = 0.099**), but is negatively correlated with anger intensity
(τ = −0.179**), fear intensity (τ = −0.168**) and sadness intensity (τ = −0.167**). The “appeal to
fear-prejudice” technique has a similar pattern.
Two propaganda techniques, “black-and-white fallacy” and “causal oversimplification”, are not found
to be correlated with any emotion intensity scores. Noted that these techniques also have less occurrences
in the dataset (gold labels < 3%; see Appendix A) and are not conceptually associated with emotional
connotation or emotional appeal by definition.
The results showed initial support to our main design intuition, which also implies that the emotional
saliences based system is likely to be effective in detecting emotions-associated (but not non-emotions-
associated) propaganda techniques.
4 System Overview
Following the the exploratory analysis, we proceed to design a predictive system named as “SocCogCom”.
Our SocCogCom system is designed to determine the specific propaganda technique used in a given text
segment from news articles. The possible techniques are based on a range of fourteen possibilities which
are defined in the official SemEval 2020 Task 11 description paper (Da San Martino et al., 2020a). Figure
1 depicts the system architecture.
Figure 1: Architecture diagram of the proposed model
Input Layer: A training example consists of the span of text that contains a propaganda technique:
x ∈ Rn and a propaganda technique label associated with the text: y ∈ {14 techniques}. x is a
sequence of words represented in the order of appearance in the vocabulary.
Features Extraction: For every input text segment, our system extracts the following features:
1. BERT features2: Sentence-level embeddings (bf ) (Devlin et al., 2018). This is a set of pre-trained
sentence-level embedding features with a total of 1,024 dimensions.
2. CrystalFeel features3: Sentence-level emotional saliences features (Gupta and Yang, 2018) (cf ).
The extracted features for each text segment include five dimensions of emotion intensity features.
3. LIWC Features: Word-level psycholinguistic features from the LIWC lexicon4 (Pennebaker et al.,
2015) (lf ). We obtained 73 extracted features that represent psycholinguistic characteristics of a
piece of text that may involve a propaganda technique.
Fusion Layer: CrystalFeel and LIWC features obtained above are first concatenated and a dense layer
is applied over the concatenated vector to obtain a feature vector, hf , of dimension dh = 50. This is
done in order to project the features extracted from CrystalFeel and LIWC to a similar latent space as
that of BERT features. Here, the extracted features, bf and hf , are simply concatenated to form the
2https://storage.googleapis.com/bert models/2018 10 18/uncased L-24 H-1024 A16.zip
3http://www.crystalfeel.socialanalyticsplus.net
4https://liwc.wpengine.com
representation: zf = [bf ;hf ] of dimension din = 1074. A dense layer with 256 dimensions is applied
over zf . After this, the final representation - of is obtained by applying a dropout layer (Srivastava et al.,
2014) with dropout rate of 0.5.
Output Layer: The system employs a fully-connected layer with softmax activation where the fused
representation of is fed.
Loss function: The categorical cross-entropy is used to calculate the loss. We minimize the loss with
an optimizer. The function that is optimized is as follows:
Ecrossentropy = −
N∑
n=1
c∑
k=1
ynk log yˆ
n
k (1)
where N is the total number of samples and c is the number of classes (in our case it is 14). ynk is the
actual label of the kth class of the nth sample and yˆnk is the prediction corresponding to the k
th class of
the nth sample.
5 Features Experiments and Results
For data pre-processing, we used Keras Tokenizer to split the text into word tokens. The sentences are
cleaned to remove unwanted characters and double spaces are replaced with single space.
We conducted the features experiments using the standard training and development datasets provided
in the official TC task, based on the system set up described in Section 3. Hyper-parameters are tuned
using a held out validation data: 10% of the training data. To optimize the parameters, we use Adam
optimizer (Kingma and Ba, 2015) with an initial learning rate of 1e−4. The experiments results are
presented in Table 3.
Model + Features Micro-averaged F1 score
Logistic Regression 0.2520
BERT Only 0.5485
CrystalFeel Only 0.5234
BERT + CrystalFeel 0.5701
BERT + CrystalFeel + LIWC 0.5626
AlBERT + CrystalFeel 0.5588
BERT + CrystalFeel + Context 0.5824
Table 3: Feature experiments results on development set.
First, we evaluated the effects of using BERT features and emotional salience features from CrystalFeel
outputs alone. BERT only obtained micro-averaged F1 score of 0.5484, showing strong performance
in comparison to a simple baseline using logistic regression. CrystalFeel features achieved 0.5234,
which shows fair performance given this is a low-dimensional features set. When combined, BERT and
CrystalFeel features achieved better results, with micro-averaged F1 score of 0.5701 than the individual
settings.
We also assessed classic word-level psycholinguistics features based on LIWC lexicons. The BERT +
LIWC condition didn’t converge, as the loss didn’t decrease and was fluctuating a lot. Adding LIWC onto
the hybrid BERT + CrystalFeel, i.e., the BERT + CrystalFeel + LIWC condition, obtained micro-averaged
F1 score of 0.5626, indicating that additional word-level psycholinguistics features do not appear to
improve over the BERT + CrystalFeel condition. We tested AlBERT + CrystalFeel too, and they did not
match the results obtained from BERT + CrystalFeel condition.
Based on the experiment results, we used the best-performing hybrid features sets (BERT + CrystalFeel)
for our system results submission for the gold test set.
After we submitted our results, we experimented a new condition where context features were added to
the BERT + CrystalFeel condition. For context, we extracted features using 3 words before and after the
target text segment. The results showed improvement (micro-averaged F1 score = 0.5824).
6 Results on Gold Test Set
Overall, on gold test set, the results released from the task organizers suggested that our system achieved
micro-averaged F1 score of 0.558 across the fourteen propaganda techniques. Table 4 shows the detailed
results showing F1 scores of our system for each propaganda technique.
Propaganda techniques F1 (development set) F1 (gold test set)
Baseline SocCogCom Baseline SocCogCom
appeal to authority 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.286
“appeal to fear-prejudice” 0.094 0.329 0.037 0.316
“bandwagon,reductio ad hitlerum” 0.000 0.571 0.000 0.098
“black-and-white fallacy” 0.000 0.214 0.000 0.265
“causal oversimplification” 0.072 0.286 0.116 0.063
“doubt” 0.192 0.540 0.291 0.604
“exaggeration,minimisation” 0.117 0.457 0.144 0.349
“flag waving” 0.083 0.771 0.062 0.543
“loaded language” 0.406 0.706 0.465 0.722
“name calling,labeling” 0.000 0.644 0.000 0.673
“repetition” 0.385 0.318 0.193 0.189
“slogans” 0.000 0.302 0.000 0.409
“thought-terminating cliches” 0.000 0.129 0.000 0.235
“whataboutism,straw men,red herring” 0.000 0.064 0.000 0.100
Micro-averaged F1 0.265 0.570 0.252 0.558
Table 4: Predictive results of our system for each propaganda techniques.
The results suggested that using relatively parsimonious features, BERT and CrystalFeel emotional
salience features, our system performed reasonably well (F1 score > 0.5) in detecting “loaded language”
(F1 = 0.772), “name calling and labeling” (0.673), “doubt” (0.604) and “flag waving” (0.543). Meanwhile,
our system struggled in detecting non-emotion associated techniques (which also happen to have imbal-
anced distributions), such as “causal oversimplification” (F1 = 0.063), “bandwagon,reductio ad hitlerum”
(F1 = 0.098), and “whataboutism, straw men, red herring” (F1 = 0.100). The results also support with our
design intuition that the sentiment and emotion intensities features help to detect propaganda techniques
which are manifested in their emotional salience in the text segment.
7 Conclusion
Propaganda is primarily information that is used to advance an agenda through influence techniques.
Our work is motivated to explore the value of emotional salience features in predicting emotion-related
propaganda techniques. In our experiments, we found that emotional salience features using CrystalFeel
emotion intensity scores can improve over BERT only features, when a simple feedforward neural network
is used in both experiment settings. Results and analysis on gold test dataset show that our approach
performed reasonably well (F1 > 0.5) in detecting “loaded language”, “name calling and labeling”,
“doubt” and “flag waving” techniques. As these are also most frequently used techniques, our system has
a potential value to facilitate publishers and general public to be alerted with these common techniques.
The system scripts are released at https://github.com/gangeshwark/PropagandaNews.
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Appendix A: Propaganda techniques, definitions and the gold labels distributions
The task TC aims to classify each given text segment for each of the fourteen propaganda techniques. The
input data is a text segment marked with superscripts indicating the start and the end characters that are
supposed to be classified. For each text segment, the output should be a classification result that marks the
existence of one or more of the fourteen propaganda techniques.
Most text segments have one corresponding technique, but some may have more than one techniques.
For example, text segment “She’s a big fan of torture” from article (id = 738361208, span start = 2396,
span end = 2422) has two gold labels “exaggeration,minimisation” and “name calling,labeling”.
It is useful to note that the class distribution for most of the techniques is highly imbalanced: 11 of
the 14 techniques have less than 10% occurrence over the total 1,043 text segments (see table below
for details). Some techniques such as “bandwagon,reductio ad hitlerum” (0.5%), “appeal to authority”
(1.3%), “thought-terminating cliches” (1.6%) have less than 2% occurrence. “loaded language” has most
occurrence (30.7%), followed by “name calling,labeling” (17.5%) and “repetition” (12.6%).
Propaganda
techniques
Definitions (Da San Martino et al., 2019)
Gold
labels
(count)
Gold
labels (%)
“appeal to authority” Stating that a claim is true simply because a
valid authority/expert on the issue supports it,
without any other supporting evidence (Good-
win, 2011)
14 1.3%
“appeal to
fear-prejudice”*
Seeking to build support for an idea by instilling
anxiety and/or panic in the population towards
an alternative, possibly based on preconceived
judgments
44 4.2%
“bandwagon, reduc-
tio ad hitlerum”
Bandwagon: Attempting to persuade the tar-
get audience to join in and take the course
of action because everyone else is taking the
same action (Hobbs and Mcgee, 2008). Re-
ductio ad hitlerum: Persuading an audience
to disapprove an action or idea by suggesting
that the idea is popular with groups hated in con-
tempt by the target audience. It can refer to any
person or concept with a negative connotation
(Teninbaum, 2009)
5 0.5%
“black-and-white
fallacy”
Presenting two alternative options as the only
possibilities, when in fact more possibilities ex-
ist (Torok, 2015). As an extreme case, telling
the audience exactly what actions to take, elimi-
nating any other possible choice (dictatorship)
22 2.1%
“causal
oversimplification”
Assuming one cause when there are multiple
causes behind an issue.
18 1.7%
“doubt” Questioning the credibility of someone or some-
thing
66 6.3%
“exaggeration,
minimisation”*
Either representing something in an exces-
sive manner: making things larger, better,
worse or making something seem less impor-
tant or smaller than it actually is (Jowett and
O’Donnell, 2018)
68 6.5%
“flag waving”* Playing on strong national feeling (or with re-
spect to a group, e.g., race, gender, political
preference) to justify or promote an action or
idea (Hobbs and Mcgee, 2008)
86 8.2%
“loaded language”* Using words/phrases with strong emotional im-
plications (positive or negative) to influence an
audience (Weston, 2018, p. 6)
320 30.7%
“name
calling,labeling”*
Labeling the object of the propaganda campaign
as either something the target audience fears,
hates, finds undesirable or otherwise loves or
praises (Miller, 1939)
183 17.5%
“repetition” Repeating the same message over and over
again, so that the audience will eventually ac-
cept it (Torok, 2015; Miller, 1939)
131 12.6%
“slogans”* A brief and striking phrase that may include
labeling and stereotyping. Slogans tend to act
as emotional appeals (Dan, 2015)
40 3.8%
“thought-
terminating
cliches”
Words or phrases that discourage critical
thought and meaningful discussion about a
given topic. They are typically short, generic
sentences that offer seemingly simple answers
to complex questions or that distract attention
away from other lines of thought (Hunter, 2015,
p. 78).
17 1.6%
“whataboutism,
straw men, red
herring”
Whataboutism: Discredit an opponent’s po-
sition by charging them with hypocrisy with-
out directly disproving their argument (Richter,
2017). Straw Men: When an opponent’s propo-
sition is substituted with a similar one which
is then refuted in place of the original (Walton,
1996). Red Herring: Introducing irrelevant
material to the issue being discussed, so that
everyones attention is diverted away from the
points made (Weston, 2018, p. 78)
29 2.8%
Table 5: Propaganda techniques, definitions and the gold labels
distributions in the development set (total n=1,043 text segments)
* These six techniques are associated with emotions by their respective definitions.
